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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the implications of the CKF, Korea’s potential 
free trade agreement (FTA) with China. It documents Korea’s 
previous FTA negotiation experiences and the lessons it has learnt 
since its first agreement was signed with Chile in February 2003. 
Pivotal to this discussion, is the role domestic politics, so-called ‘loser 
groups’, and previously hard fought FTAs play in shaping the nature 
of FTA outcomes. The paper also details the growing importance of 
China and Korea’s economic relationship, the positive and negative 
impacts a free trade deal would likely have on both countries as well 
as the geopolitical implications of any potential CKF agreement. The 
negotiation strategies currently employed in the CKF are also 
documented and two tentative scenarios (the hard bargaining game 
and the dramatic conclusion of the CKF) are hypothesized as possible 
outcomes to future talks. This paper contends that since the benefits 
of a successful CFK would far outweigh the costs associated with any 
mutual concession, the motto adopted by both Korean and Chinese 
negotiators should be one that pursues long term gain over short 
term cost. 
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I. Introduction 
 
At the China-Korea Leaders' Meeting in Beijing on 28th 
May 2012, Chinese political leader Hu Jintao and Korean 
President Lee Myung-Bak declared the official launch of the 
CKF. This is an ambitious step by China and Korea to initiate 
economic integration in East Asia. There is in fact room for 
debate on the economic benefits and costs of the FTA deal. The 
economic relationship in terms of trade and investment is so 
huge that CKF triggers strong political reactions from domestic 
constituencies in Korea and China, particularly coming from 
farmers’ organizations and labor unions in Korea. Also, there is 
prevailing skepticism on the feasibility of this bilateral negotiation.  
When we look at the new geopolitical landscape on what is 
happening in the trans-Pacific region, it is necessary to take into 
account not only economic factors, but also the geopolitical 
implications involved.  
At the 14th Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
Leaders' Meeting in Vietnam in November 2006, US President 
George W. Bush called for a bold strategy for a trans-Pacific 
APEC-wide Free Trade Area as a long-term goal. This is an 
ambitious step taken by the US to encourage trans-Pacific 
economic integration to respond to the rapidly changing geopolitical 
landscape of the region- an emerging 'new regionalism in East Asia' 
and rising Chinese economy. Furthermore, the US initiated the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2008 as an effort to 
consolidate US President W. Bush's 'Hanoi Vision' (APEC-wide 
FTA).  
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Table 1. Korea’s FTAs with its Partners 
 
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
 
The background of US initiatives such as 'Hanoi Vision' and 
'TPP Initiative' is not drawing a line in the Pacific. It means that 
the US wants to actively participate in economic integration in 
East Asia not only for economic reasons but also for geopolitical 
reasons, to say invisible hegemony game between US and China 
in this region. In this sense, geopolitical implications of the CKF 
are far-reaching for both sides. It will enable China to respond 
more effectively to the US 'TPP Initiative', which could otherwise 
seriously undermine China's trade interests in the region. For 
Korea, as China's 4th largest trading partner, China is not only 
its economic partner but also a politically important country 
which plays very crucial role in the Six-party Talks on North 
Korea's nuclear issues as well as reunification in the Korean 
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peninsula. The success of the deal therefore could become an 
important factor not only in fostering its economic prosperity 
but also in consolidating its national security interests. When 
these geopolitical implications are included in the mix, it 
becomes evident to understand the reason for why China and 
Korea want to have a FTA. 
This paper aims to analyze the geopolitical implications of 
the CKF and ongoing negotiation strategies between two countries. 
After examining Korea's FTA policy in Chapter II, Chapter III 
gives an overview on the China-Korea economic relationship 
and the economic effect of the CKF. Chapter IV, then provides 
some perspectives on the ongoing negotiation strategies and 
conclusions. 
 
 
II. Korea's FTA Policy and Some Lessons from  
Korea's FTA Negotiations Experiences  
 
1. Korea FTA Policy 
 
Korea has achieved remarkable economic development 
through the international free trade system led by the GATT and 
WTO and therefore, considered regionalism as a ‘stumbling 
block’ which discouraged the expansion of WTO regime. In this 
sense, Korea was a 'Late-Mover' to FTAs, up to the end of the 
1990s. 
However, the rapidly changing global economy and 
emerging regionalism in North America (NAFTA, 1994) and in 
Europe (expansion of EU, EU+10, 2005) forced Korea to move 
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fast toward FTA. Korea, first, had a FTA with Chile in 2003 
and then with Singapore (2005), EFTA (2005), ASEAN (2005), 
and India (2009) 
Korea and the US reached an agreement on their FTA in 
June 2007 and Korea and the EU agreed to have a FTA in 
October 2010. The US-Korea FTA Bill, being confronted by 
fierce political opposition, could not be ratified for almost 4 
years, but was narrowly ratified in December 2010. The EU-
Korea FTA and US-Korea FTA, respectively, came into effect 
in March 2012 and July 2012.  
 
As seen in Table 1, 
- So far 8 FTAs have become effective 
- Additional two FTAs (Korea-Turkey FTA and Korea-
Columbia FTA) were concluded this year (2012). 
- Finally, Korea has been negotiating for 8 FTAs including 
FTA with Canada (since 2005), Australia (since 2009), 
etc.  
 
This year, Korea opened official negotiations with 3 
countries, China (in May, 2012), Indonesia (in July, 2012), and 
Vietnam (in September, 2012). As a result, Intra-FTA trade in 
Korea represents around 35.8% of Korea's total trade in 2011, 
whereas 38% in US and 17.6% in Japan.  
The basic direction of Korea's FTA policy is to strengthen 
its trading partner’s economic cooperation through FTA, particularly 
with the US, EU, China and Japan. Korea is the first country which 
has concluded FTAs with the world’s top two economic poles 
in the world (US and EU). Korea is also negotiating a deal with 
the world’s second-largest economic power (China). Through 
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such an aggressive FTA policy, Korea would become an ‘FTA 
HUB' in East Asia, and it would also spark a ’competitive 
liberalization' in this region.  
 
2. Some Valuable Lessons to learn from Korea’s FTA 
Negotiation Experiences 
 
Korea experienced a really hard bargaining game when 
negotiating FTAs with Chile and the U.S. Valuable lessons that 
Korea has learned through these difficult experiences can be 
summarized as follows; 
First, the most important ‘stumbling block’ of FTA negotiation 
does not come from ‘Level-I game’ (international negotiation 
with Chile or the US) but from strong domestic political 
reactions and oppositions coming from so-called ‘loser groups’. 
The major loser groups were farmers’ organizations and labor 
unions.  
Second, although the loser groups would usually oppose 
FTA conclusion for economic reasons, they began to make a 
political issue out of the economic trade issue. There was an 
escalation of conflict from the economic issue to the political 
campaign. When talks were under way for the US-Korea FTA, 
Korea’s loser groups launched anti-FTA campaigns under the 
slogans such as ‘Anti-America Movement’, and ‘US Troops 
Out of Korea’. Likewise, when negotiations for the Korea-Chile 
FTA were under way, they even staged an ‘anti-WTO’ campaign.  
Third, through hard experiences with US-Korea FTA, 
Korea-Chile FTA, etc., Korean people were significantly 
educated about the true and real aspect of FTA. When Korea 
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began to negotiate with Chile for FTA, many people worried 
that the opening of the domestic market would damage the loser 
industries seriously. Korean Farmers’ organizations and anti-
FTA NGOs particularly expected the Korea-Chile FTA to bring 
catastrophic effects on their fruit-growing farms (particularly 
grapes); they believed the FTA would turn many of their fruit 
farm business into failure. It has been eight years since Chile-
Korea FTA went into effect, but without causing any particular 
damages on Korean fruit growing farmers. Korean people have 
learned a lesson from this case, gaining ‘significant confidence’ 
about FTA. This kind of ‘Korean confidence’ would help move 
the on-going negotiations forward for China-Korea.  
 
III. Overview on China-Korea Economic Relationship 
and Economic Effect of CKF 
 
1. Overview on China-Korea Economic Relationship 
 
Korea has replaced the U.S. and Japan with China as its 
most important economic partner. China has become Korea’s 
largest trade and investment partner. Looking back into modern 
history of Korean economy, the U.S. and Japan were the top 
two trade partners for Korea. It is largely because of the 
‘industrialization strategy’ that Korean business used to deploy; 
After they imported parts and components from Japan, Korean 
companies assembled them into final products and exported 
these assembled goods to the US market. But, this trading 
pattern began to change after Korea normalized diplomatic 
relations with China in 1992. Trading cooperation between 
Korea and Japan no longer remained as close as it used to be. In 
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contrast, trading volume between Korea and China has, since, 
jumped dramatically. Looking at the trading pattern among 
China, Japan and Korea, Korea posts a surplus in trade with 
China in manufacturing. As for the agricultural sector, Korea 
posts a surplus in its trade with Japan, but posts a deficit in its 
trade with China. In 2011, Korea posted a deficit of 17,182 
million USD in its trade with Japan, but Korea posted a surplus 
of 47,753 million USD in its trade with China. But, in the 
agricultural sector, Korea has posted a trade deficit of 5 billion 
USD on average during the 2006 to 2011 period; Korea’s trade 
deficit with China in the agricultural sector was 5,667 million 
USD in 2006 and 5,191 million USD in 2011.   
Let’s compare export and import volumes of bilateral trade 
among Korea, China and Japan. Korea’s shipment to Japan 
increased 2.6 times from 15 billion USD in 2002 to 40 billion 
USD in 2011. Korea’s shipment to China surged 6 times from 
24 billion USD in 2002 to 134 billion USD in 2011. As for 
import volumes, Japan had been the largest source country of 
imports for Korea until 2006. But in 2007, Korea’s imports 
from China began to be greater than Korea’s imports from 
Japan. In 2011, Korea’s imports from China amounted to 86 
billion USD, while Korea’s imports from Japan stood at 68 
USD, showing a distinct reversal of these two numbers. In 
addition, Korea’s trade balance pattern with China was opposite 
to that with Japan. Korea’s trade surplus with China has steadily 
increased from 6 billion USD in 2002 to 48 billion in 2011. In 
contrast, Korea continued to post a trade deficit with Japan 
during the 2002 to 2011 period. These statistics show the 
relative importance of Korea’s economic relationship with 
China, compared to that with Japan.  
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Table 3.1 Korea’s Trade to China & Japan 
($ million) 
 China Japan 
 Export Import Export Import 
2012(01-09) 97,458 60,326 28,872 48,414 
2011 134,185 86,432 39,680 68,320 
2010 116,838 71,574 28,176 64,296 
2008 91,389 76,930 28,252 60,956 
2006 69,459 48,557 26,534 51,926 
2004 49,763 29,585 21,701 46,144 
2002 23,754 17,400 15,143 29,856 
Source: Korea International Trade Association 
 
Table 3.2 Korea’s Trade Balance with China & Japan 
($ million) 
 China Japan 
2012(01-08) 32,013 -17,182 
2011 47,753 -28,640 
2010 45,264 -36,120 
2008 14,459 -32,704 
2006 20,903 -25,392 
2004 20,178 -24,443 
2002 6,354 -14,713 
Source: Korea International Trade Association 
  
Table 3.3 Korea’s Trade Balance in Agriculture with China & Japan 
($ million) 
 China Japan 
2011 -5,191 2,827 
2010 -5,060 1,293 
2008 -7,515 732 
2006 -5,667 812 
Source: Korea International Trade Association 
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It is not only trade but also investment that has prospered 
between Korea and China. China is Korea’s most important 
overseas investment destination. Korea’s overseas investment in 
China jumped to 4,874 million USD (2,179 projects) in 2011.1  
Korea’s investment pattern in China has also diversified from 
its initial focus on labor-intensive industries like textiles, toys, 
etc. to capital-intensive industries like electronics, automobiles, 
and shipbuilding. Hyundai-Kia Automotive Group decided to 
invest about 1 trillion won in constructing a third factory with 
an annual capacity of 300,000 units in Yancheng, Jiangsu in 
China. Once the new factory is completed, the automotive 
group’s combined annual production capacity in China with its 
existing factory in Beijing is expected to reach 1.73 million 
units. Also, Samsung Electronics is building a semiconductor 
factory worth 7 billion dollars in Xian, China. Samsung has 
invested a total of 10.5 billion dollars in China as it produces 
home electronics, mobile devices and others in China.  
 
3. Economic Effect of CKF 
 
SERI2 analyzed the forecast impact of the CKF under the 
assumption of a scenario in which the liberalization rate of the 
manufacturing sector is 100% and the liberalization rate of the 
agricultural sector is 50%. Under the scenario, Korea’s GDP is 
forecasted to increase by 2.72%, while China’s GDP is expected to 
increase by 0.35%. Also, the SERI analysis shows that CKF is 
forecasted to contribute to a 1.25% increase in China’s welfare.  
                                            
1 Korean Exim Bank, Ministry of Knowledge Economy 
2 Samsung Economic Research Institute 
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The analysis shows that Korea has more to gain than China from 
the CKF. ADB3 released some statistics that also show similar 
trends under the assumption of a scenario in which the liberalization 
rate of the manufacturing sector and agricultural sector are both 
100%. The ADB report forecasted that Korea would see a 2.70% 
rise in GDP and China would see a 0.32% rise in GDP thanks to 
CKF. In addition, the ADB report predicted that China would 
gain virtually nothing in terms of welfare but Korea would have 
a 0.95% gain in its welfare as a result of CKF. 
Besides, it should consider loser industries versus winner 
industries that would occur on both sides in Korea and China, if 
the CKF becomes effective. As Table 3.5 shows on the Korean 
side, the largest loser industry is the agricultural sector. First, 
Korea is worried about the possible damaging effects of the 
CKF on Korean farmers, as the CKF would spark a large inflow 
of Chinese-grown farm products like garlic, onions, red peppers 
and apples into the Korean market. Second, Korea is worried 
about the negative impact of the CKF on Korean small and 
                                            
3 Asian Development Bank 
4 ADB: The report assumed that both manufacturing and agriculture would be fully opened.  
5 SERI: The report assumed 100% opening of manufacturing sector and 50% opening of 
agricultural sector and accumulation of capital. 
Table 3.4 Output and Welfare Effects of CKF 
(unit:%)
 
China Korea 
GDP Welfare GDP Welfare 
ADB4 0.32 0.00 2.70 0.95 
SERI5 0.35 0.22 2.72 1.25 
(1) ADB: Asian Development Bank 
(2) SERI: Samsung Economic Research Institute 
 
68 Se-Young AHN/ JeongGon KIM  
Table 3.5 Sectoral Impact of CKF: Winner Industries and 
Loser Industries in China and Korea 
 
 Korea China 
“Losers” 
Agriculture 
-Garlic 
-Onion 
-Red Pepper 
-Apple  
Labor intensive products 
   Automotive 
   Petrochemical 
   Service 
“Winners” 
Automotive 
Petrochemical 
Service 
Finance, Insurance, telecom etc. 
Agriculture 
-Garlic 
-Onion 
-Red Pepper 
-Apple 
Labor intensive products 
Source: Korea International Trade Association 
 
medium sized companies; it is worried the CKF will cause a 
large inflow of the Chinese-made price-competitive, labor-
intensive products into Korean market. In contrast, CKF is 
forecasted to benefit such ‘winner industries’ as the Korean 
automotive, petrochemicals and service sectors. In the service 
sector, Korean finance, insurance and telecommunication sectors 
are forecasted to be particular beneficiaries of economic gains from 
the CKF. Meanwhile, China’s agricultural sector and labor-
intensive sector are forecasted to be winner industries, while 
Chinese automotive, petrochemical and service sectors would 
be loser industries. Although both China and Korea have 
researched the impact of the CKF on the Chinese and Korean 
economies, the reality could be different from the research. 
When we look at cases of FTA in the US, Mexico, Israel, etc., 
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FTA produced economic effects that are totally different from 
earlier forecasts. One example is US-Israel FTA(1985). When 
the Israeli government moved to sign an FTA with the US, it 
faced fierce political opposition from a lot of experts. They 
were worried about the huge trade deficit that they would incur 
as a result of an FTA between a small country like Israel and a 
global economic superpower like the US. Twenty years later, 
however, it has turned out to be opposite their expectations; 
Israel enjoys a trade surplus with the US.  
Another example is NAFTA. At that time, US farmers’ 
organizations were opposed to signing an FTA with Mexico; 
American corn-growing farmers were particularly worried 
about the massive import of Mexican-grown cheap corns into 
the US market. It turns out to be different from their worries, 
however. USDA analysis shows that the US shipment of corn to 
Mexico surged from 0.91 million tons before NAFTA (became 
effective) to 5.8 million tons in 2003 and 7.9 million tons in 
2010 after NAFTA became effective.  
In Korea, farmers expected Korea’s FTA with Chile to 
almost destroy Korean fruit farms; Korean farmers worried 
FTA would spark a huge inflow of cheap Chilean grapes into 
the Korean market, which did not happen as they had worried. 
Considering these situations, it would not be desirable for both 
countries to show too much concern about their loser industries 
or show political reaction to their loser industries.   
What FTA means literally is mutual opening of the market. 
In other words, FTA presents both crisis and opportunity for 
both the Chinese economy and the Korean economy. It would, 
therefore, be in their mutual interests for both countries – 
business community, government officials, researchers, NGOs, 
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farmer’s organizations, trade unions, etc. - to seek to maximize 
opportunity factors and to minimize risk factors of the CKF. 
This way, it would be in their best interest for Korea and China 
to work together towards achieving a common goal of win-win 
outcome from the agreement. 
 
 
IV. Perspectives on the On-going Deal between  
China and Korea 
 
1. Negotiation Strategies of both sides of the CKF deal 
 
Four rounds of the working-level negotiations have been 
held between the Chinese government delegation and the 
Korean government delegation since the declaration of the two 
political leaders in Beijing, May, 2012. The first round of 
negotiations was held in Beijing on May 14, and the latest 
round was held in Kyungju, Korea, from Oct. 30 to Nov. 1 later 
in the same year.  
Represented by FTA chief negotiator of Trade negotiation 
headquarters, the Korean delegation consisted of officials from 
related ministries: the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Ministry 
of Knowledge and Economy, Ministry for Food, Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries, etc. Led by Chinese commerce deputy 
ministry, the Chinese delegation consisted of officials from 
related ministries. Negotiation is under way to prepare negotiation 
modality by sectors, including merchandise products, non-tariff 
barriers, etc. Also, experts’ meetings have been held to cover 
service, investment, IPR, etc.  
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It seems that both parties are conducting a 'hard-positional 
bargaining'. 
First, the Korean government's basic position in this deal is 
that 'the highly sensitive agricultural products' such as rice, 
garlic, etc should be excluded from the CKF framework. It is 
just like how rice is excluded from the US-Korea FTA. 
However, China, expecting a significant surge in exports of 
agricultural products to Korea through the CKF, takes a hard 
position that the market opening of agricultural products should 
be seriously discussed in CKF negotiation. In this sense, 
Agriculture is the hottest issue in CKF negotiation. 
Second, when it comes to negotiation strategies, Korea and 
China have different preferences on "how to negotiate". Korea 
prefers 'single-understanding approach’ to 'staging approach' 
whereas China prefers ‘staging approach’ to ‘single-understanding 
approach.’ China has already signed the FTA/EPA with ASEAN, 
Pakistan, Taiwan, etc. by using the "staging" method; China 
negotiated the manufacturing sector first, then, after that, it 
negotiated service, IPR, investment, etc.  But, Korea thinks the 
CKF should be comprehensive. And Korea does not expect the 
staging method to lead to a comprehensive FTA. Because Korea 
worries that if they use the staging method as China would 
prefer, the CKF would not lead to a satisfactory level of 
liberalization. Instead, Korea thinks that the staging method 
would lead only to partial opening of service sectors. What 
Korea expects from the CKF is not only the market opening of 
the manufacturing sector but also the opening of the service 
sector as well as the removal of the ‘invisible trade barriers.   
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2. Two Scenarios 
  
Therefore, it is extremely difficult to forecast the future 
direction of ongoing CKF negotiations. However, this paper 
proposes two very tentative scenarios for a CKF 
Our prior discussion makes it clear to consider the importance 
of not only economic factors but also geopolitical implications 
when we discuss the FTA negotiation between Korea and 
China. Therefore, if we are to predict the future direction of the 
CKF deal to move forward, we can analyze the geopolitical 
implicational domestic political factors. Then, with the analysis, 
we can predict two possible scenarios on how the CKF deal 
would go ahead as follows:   
 
Scenario 1: Hard-bargaining Game 
 
Despite efforts by Chinese and Korean trade officials to 
move negotiations forward, progress remains very limited, since 
both governments continue to employ hard bargaining positions 
in order to maximize their individual trade interests at the 
expense of the other. Negotiations could be described as a 
‘zero-sum game’ 
Considering the very close economic relationship between 
two countries, the economic impact of the CKF is so tremendous 
that Chinese and Korean negotiators are highly likely to decline 
to make any concession in what each considers highly sensitive 
items. In this regard, let us consider the FTA negotiation that 
has unsuccessfully taken place between Korea and Japan for the 
past ten years. Japan could not move forward because of a 
strong political reaction coming from farmers' organizations, 
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whereas Korea was confronted by fierce political opposition 
coming from SME and labor unions in parts & components 
industries. Something similar may happen again in Korea-China 
negotiation for CKF, if Korea and China take similar reactions. 
In this scenario, CKF is likely to remain at a stalemate for more 
than ten years as it has been with Korea-Japan FTA.   
 
Scenario 2: Dramatic Conclusion of CKF  
 
CKF can be concluded dramatically at a much surprisingly 
earlier time than expected, if the two countries’ leaders, 
particularly from the Chinese leaders, take the ‘political 
consideration’ of CKF. As mentioned in this paper, 'super 
powers', US and China, are sometimes likely to have 'political 
FTA'. A prime example is the conclusion of the FTA between 
the US and Jordan in 2000, and US-Israel FTA in 1985, and 
China-Pakistan FTA in 2009.  
In this scenario, strong political leadership, particularly 
from the Chinese leader plays a crucial role and political 
concerns override economic ones. As a result, both sides create 
a ‘package deal’ or ‘give and take deal.' This means that the 
politically highly sensitive items would be excluded or a 
compromise would be reached on certain points to find a 
solution which satisfies not only the two negotiating sides, but 
also domestic constituencies.6 
                                            
6 Market opening of agriculture is one of the hottest issues in trade negotiations. Korea is 
demanding the exclusion of a number of specific sensitive items from the FTA, including rice, 
beans, beef, pork, chicken, garlic, apples, pears, grapes, and oranges. The US position on the 
agricultural market is a hardline demand that the market be fully opened without exception. At 
the final stage, both sides will work toward a compromise on certain points to find a solution 
which satisfies not only the other side, but also domestic interest groups. 
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There are several reasons that support the possibility of a 
‘politically considered’ conclusion of the FTA from the Chinese 
side.  
 
4. Trade Diversion Effect of US-Korea FTA and  
EU-Korea FTA 
 
The US-Korea FTA became effective in March 2012 and 
the EU-Korea FTA became effective in July, 2011. This partially 
explains why China has increased the need to strengthen its 
economic relations with Korea. The US had been Korea’s 
largest trade partner until 2003. In 2004, China replaced the US 
as Korea’s largest trade partner. The bilateral trade volume 
between China and Korea has, since, increased from $79 billion 
in 2004 to $221 billion in 2011.  
 
Table 4. Korea's Major Trading Partner 
 (Billion US$) 
 2003 2004 2006 2008 2010 2011 
US 
59 
(15.8%) 
72 
(15.0%) 
70 
(12.2%) 
85 
(19.5%) 
90 
(10.1%) 
101 
(9.3%) 
China 
57 
(15.3%) 
79 
(16.6%) 
107 
(18.6%) 
168 
(38.7%) 
188 
(21.1%) 
221 
(20.4%) 
Source: Korea International Trade Association 
 
There is the trade diversion effect that resulted from the 
US-Korea FTA and EU-Korea FTA. The trade diversion effect 
may weaken the China-Korea economic relationship.  
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4. Hegemony Game in East Asia  
 
It is not only the economic aspect but also the political 
aspect that China needs to strengthen relations with Korea. 
China needs to forge a stronger relation with Korea, as China 
plays a hegemony game with the US in East Asia, and China 
wants to create a Greater Chinese Economic Zone (GCEZ).7 In 
East Asia, Japan maintains a solid alliance with the US both 
politically and economically. But Korea plays a role as an 
intermediary country between the US-Japan superpowers and 
China.   
 
5. US ‘Trans Pacific Partnership Initiative’ vs. China’s 
‘Bilateral FTA Initiative’ 
 
The impact of Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) is also hard 
to ignore. China’s trade policy to initiate economic integration 
by creating GCEZ in East Asia conflicts with US interests. The 
basic direction of US trade policy towards East Asia is to “not 
draw the line in the Pacific between the US and E. Asia”. As 
part of this policy, former US President George W. Bush 
unveiled the “Hanoi Vision’ at the APEC Leaders’ Meeting in 
2006. After that, the US proposed TPP in 2008. Now ‘P9'8 
countries participate in the TPP. In November 2011, Japanese 
Prime Minister Noda expressed his intent to join the TPP when 
                                            
7 Ahn, Se Young, “Geopolitical Implications of the US-Korea and its Domestic Politics,” 
paper presented at the Int’l Conference organized by CSIS (Center for Strategic and Int’l 
Studies) & ChosunIlbo,Washington,D.C., September26-27,2006. 
8 Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, 
and the United States 
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he attended the Honolulu APEC Leaders' Meeting in November 
2011. Confronting the US’s ‘TPP initiative’, however, China 
took the ‘Bilateral FTA initiative’ policy. Under this initiative, 
China leads the regional economic integration by signing FTAs 
with countries in the Asian region. In order for the ‘Bilateral 
FTA initiative’ to come true, China needs to sign an FTA with 
Korea. If the CKF is signed, Korea would have a reduced 
incentive to participate in TPP because Korea has already signed an 
FTA with seven countries like Chile and Singapore from among 
the nine participating countries of P9.   
 
6. Easy Domestic Politics 
 
As shown by Korea’s experiences in FTA deals with Chile 
and the US, FTA negotiation is typically a ‘two-level game’ as 
Putnam said. A Level I game is the official international 
negotiation between two governments to sign a tentative agreement. 
A Level II game is the domestic negotiation to persuade diverse 
domestic interest groups like the national assembly, farmers’ 
organizations or labor union for its ratification. In this regard, 
China is almost free from political reaction to play at the Level 
II game. Therefore, China would face little burden when China 
tries to politically conclude the FTA with Korea.   
Finally, Korea also has a non-economic reason for signing 
an FTA with China. Because China has a significant influence 
on the reunification of the Korean peninsula and the six-party 
talks on North Korea’s nuclear weapon program. Korea thinks 
that if CKF is concluded, they can upgrade Korea’s relationship 
with China from ‘economic partner’ to ‘economic alliance’.  
In the second scenario, under strong leadership, the two 
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countries would recognize the highly-sensitive items as 
exceptional items to be excluded from their coverage, negotiating 
their way to sign the deal.  For example, Korea would try to 
exclude some farm products such as rice or garlic from the 
negotiation, while China would try to exclude some of 
manufacturing sectors like petrochemicals from the negotiation.  
 
 
V. Conclusion  
 
CKF is a key leverage to move forward economic integration 
in East Asia. 9  The research of this paper can lead to the 
conclusions as follows:  
First, geopolitical and historical ties between two countries 
provide a strong foundation for China and Korea to have a 
‘Mixed-FTA’10 
Second, if the China-Korea FTA deal is concluded through 
this kind of political leadership, it will eventually become a 
‘comprehensive and mid-level FTA'. The China-Korea deal will 
include a broad range of issues, from trade and investment to 
intellectual property rights, service, trade remedies, competition, 
and more. In this sense, the China-Korea FTA will certainly be 
a comprehensive one.  
When it comes to highly sensitive issues that have the 
potential to be deal-breakers, a mid-level FTA would allow 
China and Korea to exclude certain items from CKF frameworks.11 
                                            
9 Jianping. Zhang, “Analysis on Issues and Prospects of China-Korea FTA,” The Paper for 
KIEP Visiting Scholar Project, Seoul, 2006. 
10 economic and geopolitical FTA 
11 During negotiations of an FTA between the US and Australia, sugar proved to be a deal 
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This is possible, of course, only as long as these ‘significant 
exceptions’ are not against the GATT/WTO regulations, 
particularly the GATTXXIV-8.12 
For all the reasons discussed so far, a mid-level FTA 
would be a much more desirable outcome for both sides than 
not having an FTA between the two countries. Chinese and 
Korean negotiators must find some room for productive 
concessions in upcoming talks. The market-opening of Korean 
agriculture is a case in point. Korean farmers are demanding the 
exclusion of most agricultural products from the deal, whereas 
China is in a firm position of complete market opening.   
The extent to which the China-Korea FTA will affect the 
two countries is not predetermined but will depend greatly on 
the negotiation game in upcoming rounds. While judgment 
must be reserved until a final deal becomes public, “Short term 
cost for long term gain” should be the motto to be adopted by 
both parties since a successful FTA could far outweigh the costs 
of mutual concessions on limited economic issues.  
  
                                                                                             
breaker, and subsequently, was completely excluded from the US-Australia FTA. 
12 GATT XXIV-8: “In regard to interim agreements, the working party may in its report make 
appropriate recommendations on the proposed time-frame and on measures required to 
complete the formation of the customs union or free-trade area. It may if necessary provide 
for further review of the agreement.” The full text of the GATT agreement can be found at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/10-24_e.htm  
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